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The growing importance of cyber security in national defense is unquestionable. 1 Increased use of commercial off the shelf (COTS) information technology and dependency on computerized information systems (CIS) for weapons, intelligence, communication, and logistics continues to increase the vulnerability of military missions to cyber-attacks. Successful mission execution requires highly capable technologies that result in forces performing a broad range of defensive cyber operations for each step of an attacker's life cycle.
While many of these defensive cyber operations rely on essentially ad-hoc techniques, there is a growing realization, within the cyber community, that a comprehensive, systematic, principle-based, modeling and simulation (M&S) approach is more likely to produce long-term, lasting, reusable approaches for cyber defense. Such a paradigm is predicated on creation and validation of mechanisms of modeling the organization whose mission is subject to assessment, the mission (or missions) itself, and the cyber-vulnerable systems that support the mission. The models are then used to simulate or otherwise portray the cyber-attacks and associated defensive phenomena and system operations, including the assessment of mission impact.
One could also take a broader perspective and argue that a model-driven approach is essential for development of a science of cyber security. As discussed by this writer, 2 the central role of models in science is well recognized; and a science is a collection of models. The science of cyber security develops a coherent family of models of relations between attributes, structures, and dynamics of violations of cyber security policy; the network of computing devices under attack; the defenders' tools and techniques; and the attackers' tools and techniques where malicious software plays the central role.
The main objective of this special issue is to offer the readers a broad yet integrated exploration in the field of study of models in cyber security, while providing a publishing venue for researchers working toward a multi-purpose, integrated, system of cyber models, that guide a broad range of cyber security operations; examples include vulnerability analysis, intrusion prevention, intrusion detection, analysis, forensics, attribution, mission impact assessment, and recovery.
The • stress the need for M&S for the full range of cyber specialties, not only for training and rehearsal; • encourage participation of commercial companies in NATO STO activities and meetings, with an option to demonstrate their relevant products; • produce a set of clear and concrete requirements for M&S tools specifically targeted at cyber defense; • recommend simulation of attack-defense scenarios at a level of observable, component-network-andsystem-level events; • encourage academic research targeted at effective and validated M&S of human cognitive processes and behaviors as they execute cyber defense and attack.
An earlier NATO workshop (IST-128-RWS-019, ''Cyber Attack Detection, Forensics and Attribution for Assessment of Mission Impact'') also voiced a strong consensus that substantive solutions for at least some classes of cyber challenges, for example mission impact assessment, require adopting and developing a new model-driven paradigm. 4, 5 In effect, this special issue is a step toward responding to some of these recommendations. The issue is published in two parts. The first part -the one you are currently reading -is dedicated primarily to M&S as means to characterize the vulnerability of a system or network to cyberattacks, and to assess the extent of detrimental impacts that are likely to be affected by the attacks. The second part of the issue takes a look at M&S approaches used to devise and optimize the design of the system and the run-time defensive actions that would mitigate the impact of cyberattacks. In the following, I introduce the papers of Part 1.
We open it with a paper by Hatleback that presents a perspective -philosophy of science -that rarely finds its way into applied technology publications such as this journal. In this paper, the author assesses the state of cyber security as a science by considering the degree to which it relies on systematic modeling approaches.
We then continue with several papers that explore modeling of system vulnerability as a function of threat properties and of system properties. Moskal, Yang, and Kuhl show how to use attack scenario simulation to assess the success probabilities of various types of attackers. Celik, McDaniel, and Bowen present an approach to modeling and assessing the likelihood of successful detection of malware depending on the properties of the detection mechanisms. Then, Leslie and co-workers describe statistical modeling approaches that link the probability of successful cyber intrusions to properties and behaviors of an organization under attack.
Successful intrusions, however, do differ in the impact they have on the mission of the system. A paper by Brown and Brown describes tools for simulation of networks that enable assessment of the impact defined as the number of infected clients in the case of a relatively straightforward malware propagation process. Then, Albanese and Jajodia show how to model the impact of complex, multi-step attacks.
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